HyperPCTL: A Temporal Logic for Probabilistic Hyperproperties by Abraham, Erika & Bonakdarpour, Borzoo
ar
X
iv
:1
80
4.
01
85
3v
1 
 [c
s.L
O]
  5
 A
pr
 20
18
HyperPCTL: A Temporal Logic for Probabilistic
Hyperproperties
Erika A´braha´m1 and Borzoo Bonakdarpour2
1 RWTH Aachen University, Germany
2 Iowa State University, USA
Abstract. In this paper, we propose a new logic for expressing and
reasoning about probabilistic hyperproperties. Hyperproperties charac-
terize the relation between different independent executions of a system.
Probabilistic hyperproperties express quantitative dependencies between
such executions. The standard temporal logics for probabilistic systems,
i.e., PCTL and PCTL∗ can refer only to a single path at a time and,
hence, cannot express many probabilistic hyperproperties of interest. The
logic proposed in this paper, HyperPCTL, adds explicit and simultaneous
quantification over multiple traces to PCTL. Such quantification allows
expressing probabilistic hyperproperties. A model checking algorithm for
the proposed logic is also given for discrete-time Markov chains.
1 Introduction
Four decades ago, Lamport [20] used the notion of trace properties as a means
to specify the correctness of individual executions of concurrent programs. This
notion was later formalized and classified by Alpern and Schneider [1] to safety
and liveness properties. Temporal logics (e.g., LTL [21] and CTL [4]) were built
based on these efforts to give formal syntax and semantics to requirements of
trace properties. Subsequently, verification algorithms were developed to reason
about individual traces of a system.
It turns out that many interesting requirements are not trace properties.
For example, important information-flow security policies such as noninterfer-
ence3 [13] and observational determinism4 [27] cannot be expressed as properties
of individual execution traces of a system. Also, service level agreement require-
ments (e.g., mean response time and percentage uptime) that use statistics of a
system across all executions of a system are not trace properties. Rather, they
are properties of sets of execution traces, also known as hyperproperties [7]. Tem-
poral logics HyperLTL and HyperCTL∗ [5] have been proposed to provide a unifying
framework to express and reason about hyperproperties. They allow explicit and
simultaneous quantification over multiple paths to LTL and to CTL∗.
3 Noninterference stipulates that input commands from high-privileged users have no
effect on the system behavior observed by low-privileged observers.
4 Observational determinism requires that two executions that start at two low initial
states appear deterministic to a low user.
Hyperproperties can also be probabilistic. Such probabilistic hyperproperties
generally express probabilistic relations between independent executions of a
system. For example, in information-flow security, adding probabilities is moti-
vated by establishing a connection between information theory and information
flow across multiple traces. It is also motivated by using probabilistic schedulers,
which opens up an opportunity for the attacker to set up a probabilistic covert
channel, whereby information is obtained by statistical inferences drawn from
the relative frequency of outcomes of a repeated computation. Policies that de-
fend against such an attempt, known as probabilistic noninterference, stipulate
that the probability of every low-observable trace be the same for every low-
equivalent initial state. Such policies quantify on different execution traces and
the probability of reaching certain states in the independent and simultaneous
executions.
Consider the following classic example [25] comprising of two threads th and
th′:
th : while h > 0 do {h← h− 1}; l ← 2 || th′ : l← 1
where h is an input by a high-privileged user and l is an output observable by
low-privileged users. Probabilistic noninterference would require that l obtains
values of 1 and 2 with the same probability, regardless of the initial value of h.
However, assuming that the scheduler chooses to execute atomic statements of
the threads th and th′ iteratively with uniform probability distribution, the likely
outcome of the race between the two assignments l ← 1 and l ← 2 depends on the
initial value of h: the larger the initial value of h, the greater the probability that
the final value of l is 2. For example, if the initial value of h is 0 in one execution,
then the final value of l is 1 with probability 1/4 and 2 with probability 3/4, but
for the initial value h = 5 in another independent execution we can observe the
final value l = 1 with probability 1/4096 and l = 2 with probability 4095/4096.
Thus, it holds that for two independent executions with initial h values 0 resp.
5 the larger h value leads to a lower probability for l = 1 upon termination. I.e.,
this program does not satisfy probabilistic noninterference.
It is straightforward to observe that requirements such as probabilistic non-
interference cannot be expressed in existing probabilistic temporal logics such as
PCTL [15] and PCTL∗, as they cannot draw connection between the probability
of reaching certain states in independent executions. With this motivation, in
this paper, we propose the temporal logic HyperPCTL that generalizes PCTL by
allowing explicit quantification over initial states and, hence, multiple computa-
tion trees simultaneously, as well as probability of occurring propositions that
stipulate relationships among those traces. For the above example, the following
HyperPCTL formula expresses probabilistic noninterference, which obviously does
not hold:
∀σ.∀σ′.
(
hσ 6= hσ′
)
⇒
((
P (l = 1)σ = P(l = 1)σ′
)
∧
(
P (l = 2)σ = P(l = 2)σ′
))
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That is, for any two executions from initial states σ and σ′ (i.e., initial values
of h), the probability distribution of terminating with value 1 = 1 (or l = 2) is
uniform.
In addition to probabilistic noninterference, we show that HyperPCTL can ex-
press other important requirements and policies, some not related to information-
flow security. First, we show HyperPCTL subsumes probabilistic bisimulation. We
also show that HyperPCTL can express requirements such as differential privacy,
quantitative information flow, and probabilistic causation (a.k.a. causality). We
also present a HyperPCTL model checking algorithm for discrete-time Markov
chains (DTMCs). The complexity of the algorithm is polynomial-time in the
size of the input DTMC and is PSPACE-hard in the size of the input HyperPCTL
formula. We also discuss a wide range of open problem to be tackled by future
research. We believe that this paper opens a new area in rigorous analysis of
probabilistic systems.
Organization The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the
syntax and semantics of HyperPCTL. Section 3 provides a diverse set of exam-
ple requirements that HyperPCTL can express. We present our model checking
algorithm in Section 4. Related work is discussed in Section 5. Finally, we make
concluding remarks and discuss future work in Section 6.
2 HyperPCTL
In this section, we present the syntax and semantics of HyperPCTL.
Definition 1. A (discrete-time) Markov chain (DTMC) M = (S,P,AP, L) is
a tuple with the following components:
– S is a finite nonempty set of states,
– P : S×S → [0, 1] is a transition probability function with
∑
s′∈S P(s, s
′) = 1
for all states s ∈ S,
– AP is a set of atomic propositions, and
– L : S → 2AP is a labeling function. 
A path of a Markov chainM = (S,P,AP, L) is defined as an infinite sequence
π = s0s1s2 · · · ∈ Sω of states with P(si, si+1) > 0, for all i ≥ 0; we write π[i]
for si. Let Paths
s(M) denote the set of all (infinite) paths starting in s in M,
and Pathssfin(M) denote the set of all finite prefixes of paths from Paths
s(M),
which we sometimes call finite paths.
2.1 Syntax
HyperPCTL state formulas are inductively defined by the following grammar:
ψ ::= ∀σ.ψ
∣∣∣ ∃σ.ψ ∣∣∣ true ∣∣∣ aσ ∣∣∣ ψ ∧ ψ ∣∣∣ ¬ψ ∣∣∣ p ∼ p
p ::= P(ϕ)
∣∣∣ c ∣∣∣ p+ p ∣∣∣ p− p ∣∣∣ p · p
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where c ∈ Q, a ∈ AP is an atomic proposition, ∼∈ {<,≤,=,≥, >}, σ is a state
variable from a countably infinite supply of variables V = {σ1, σ2, . . .}, p is a
probability expressions, and ϕ is a path formula. HyperPCTL path formulas are
formed according to the following grammar:
ϕ ::= ψ
∣∣∣ ψ U ψ ∣∣∣ ψ U [k1,k2] ψ
where ψ is a state formulas and k1, k2 ∈ N≥0 with k1 ≤ k2.
We also introduce state formulas of the form p ∈ J , where J = [l, u] ⊆
[0, 1] is an interval with rational bounds, as syntactic sugar for l ≤ p ∧ p ≤ u.
We also define the syntactic sugar ψ1 U ≤k ψ2 for ψ U [0,k] ψ. Also, ψ1 ∨ ψ2 =
¬(¬ψ1 ∧ ¬ψ2), ψ = true U ψ, ψ = ¬ ¬ψ,
[k1,k2] ψ = true U [k1,k2] ψ,
and [k1,k2] ψ = ¬ [k1,k2] ¬ψ. We denote by F the set of all HyperPCTL state
formulas.
An occurrence of an indexed atomic proposition aσ in a HyperPCTL state
formula ψ is free if it is not in the scope of a quantifier bounding σ and otherwise
bound ; we denote by Free(ψ) the set of all indexed atomic propositions with at
least one free occurrence in ψ. HyperPCTL sentences are HyperPCTL state formulas
in which all occurrences of all indexed atomic propositions are bound. HyperPCTL
(quantified) formulas are HyperPCTL sentences.
Example Consider the formula
∀σ1.∃σ2.P( aσ1) = P( bσ2).
This formula is true if for each state s1 there exists another state s2 such that the
probability to finally reach a state labelled with a from s1 equals the probability
of reaching b from s2.
2.2 Semantics
We present the semantics of HyperPCTL based on n-ary self-composition of a
DTMC. We emphasize that it is possible to define the semantics in terms of the
non-self-composed DTMC, but it will essentially result in a very similar setting,
but more difficult to understand.
Definition 2. The n-ary self-composition of a DTMC M = (S,P,AP, L) is a
DTMC Mn = (Sn,Pn,APn, Ln) with
– Sn = S × . . .× S is the n-ary Cartesian product of S,
– Pn
(
s, s′) = P(s1, s
′
1
)
· . . . · P(sn, s′n) for all s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S
n and s′ =
(s′1, . . . , s
′
n) ∈ S
n,
– AP
n = ∪ni=1APi, where APi = {ai | a ∈ AP} for i ∈ [1, n], and
– Ln(s) = ∪ni=1Li(si) for all s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S
n with Li(si) = {ai | a ∈
L(si)} for i ∈ [1, n]. 
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The satisfaction of a HyperPCTL quantified formula by a DTMCM = (S,P,AP, L)
is defined by:
M |= ψ iff M, () |= ψ
where () is the empty sequence of states. Thus, the satisfaction relation |= defines
the values of HyperPCTL quantified, state, and path formulas in the context of
a DTMC M = (S,P,AP, L) and an n-tuple s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Sn of states
(which is () for n = 0). Intuitively, the state sequence s stores instantiations for
quantified state variables. Remember that HyperPCTL quantified formulas are
sentences. The semantics evaluates HyperPCTL formulas by structural recursion.
Quantifiers are instantiated and the instantiated values for state variables are
stored in the state sequence s. To maintain the connection between a state in this
sequence and the state variable which it instantiates, we introduce the auxiliary
syntax ai with a ∈ AP and i ∈ N>0, and if we instantiate σ in ∃σ.ψ or ∀σ.ψ
by state s, then we append s at the end of the state sequence and replace all
aσ that is bound by the given quantifier by ai with i being the index of s in
the state sequence. We will express the meaning of path formulas based on the
n-ary self-composition of M; the index i for the instantiation of σ also fixes
the component index in which we keep track of the paths starting in σ. The
semantics judgment rules are the following:
M, s |= ∀σ.ψ iff ∀sn+1 ∈ S. M, (s1, . . . , sn, sn+1) |= ψ[APn+1/APσ]
M, s |= ∃σ.ψ iff ∃sn+1 ∈ S. M, (s1, . . . , sn, sn+1) |= ψ[APn+1/APσ]
M, s |= true
M, s |= ai iff a ∈ L(si)
M, s |= ψ1 ∧ ψ2 iff M, s |= ψ1 and M, s |= ψ2
M, s |= ¬ψ iff M, s 6|= ψ
M, s |= p1 ∼ p2 iff Jp1KM,s ∼ Jp2KM,s
JP(ϕ)KM,s = Pr{π ∈ Paths
s(Mn) | M, π |= ϕ}
JcKM,s = c
Jp1 + p2KM,s = Jp1KM,s + Jp2KM,s
Jp1 − p2KM,s = Jp1KM,s − Jp2KM,s
Jp1 · p2KM,s = Jp1KM,s · Jp2KM,s
where ψ, ψ1 and ψ2 are HyperPCTL state formulas; the substitution ψ[APn+1/APσ]
replaces for each atomic proposition a ∈ AP each free occurrence of aσ in ψ by
an+1; a ∈ AP is an atomic proposition and 1 ≤ i ≤ n; p1 and p2 are probability
expressions and ∼∈ {<,≤,=,≥, >}; ϕ is a HyperPCTL path formula and c is a
rational constant.
The satisfaction relation for HyperPCTL path formulas is defined as follows,
where π is a path of Mn for some n ∈ N>0; ψ, ψ1, and ψ2 are HyperPCTL state
formulas and k ∈ N≥0:
M, π |= ψ iff M, π[1] |= ψ
M, π |= ψ1 U ψ2 iff ∃j ≥ 0.
(
M, π[j] |= ψ2 ∧ ∀i ∈ [0, j).M, π[i] |= ψ1
)
M, π |= ψ1 U [k1,k2] ψ2 iff ∃j ∈ [k1, k2].
(
M, π[j] |= ψ2 ∧ ∀i ∈ [0, j).M, π[i] |= ψ1
)
5
Note that the semantics assures that each path formula ϕ is evaluated in the
context of a path of Mn such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n for each ai in ϕ.
Example Consider the DTMCM in Fig. 1 and the following HyperPCTL formula:
ψ = ∀σ.∀σ′.(initσ ∧ initσ′)⇒
(
P( aσ) = P( aσ′)
)
s0 s1
s2 s3 s4
s5 s6
{init} {init}
{a}
{a}
0.4 0.2
0.4
0.7 0.3
1 0.8 0.2 1
1 1
Fig. 1: Semantics example.
This formula is satisfied by M if for
all pairs of initial states (labelled by
the atomic proposition init) the prob-
ability to satisfy a is the same, i.e.,
for each (si, sj) ∈ S2 with init ∈
L(si) and init ∈ L(sj) it holds that
M, (si, sj) |= P( a1) = P( a2). The
probability of reaching a from s0 is
0.4 + (0.2 × 0.2) = 0.44. Moreover,
the probability of reaching a from s1
is 0.3 + (0.7 × 0.2) = 0.44. Hence, we
have M |= ψ.
3 HyperPCTL in Action
We now put HyperPCTL into action by formulating probabilistic requirements
from different areas, such as information-flow security, privacy, and causality
analysis.
3.1 Probabilistic Bisimulation
A bisimulation is an equivalence relation over a set of states of a system such that
equivalent states cannot be distinguished by observing their behaviors. In the
context of DTMC states and PCTL properties, a probabilistic bisimulation is an
equivalence relation over the DTMC states such that any two equivalent states
satisfy the same PCTL formulas. The latter property can be assured inductively
by requiring that equivalent states have the same labels and the probability to
move from them to any of the equivalence classes is the same.
Assume a partitioning S1, . . . , Sk of S with ∪ki=1Si = S and Si ∩ Sj = ∅ for
all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k. To express that the equivalence relation R = ∪ki=1Si × Si is
a bisimulation, we define M′ = (S,P,AP′, L′) with AP′ = AP ∪ {a1, . . . , ak},
where each ai, for all i ∈ [1, k], is a fresh atomic proposition not in AP, and
for each s ∈ Si, we set L′(s) = L(s) ∪ {ai}. The equivalence relation R is a
bisimulation for M if M′ satisfies the following HyperPCTL formula
ϕpb = ∀σ.∀σ
′.
k∧
i=1

(aiσ ∧ aiσ′)⇒
[
ψAP ∧ P
(
k∧
j=1
(
P( ajσ) = P( a
j
σ′)
))
= 1
]
where ψAP =
∧
a∈AP(aσ ↔ aσ′).
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3.2 Probabilistic Noninterfence
Noninterference is an information-flow security policy that enforces that a low-
privileged user (e.g., an attacker) should not be able to distinguish two computa-
tions from their publicly observable outputs if they only vary in their inputs by a
high-privileged user (e.g., a secret). Probabilistic noninterference [17] establishes
connection between information theory and information flow by employing prob-
abilities to address covert channels. Intuitively, it requires that the probability
of every low-observable trace pattern is the same for every low-equivalent initial
state. Probabilistic noninterference can be expressed in HyperPCTL as follows:
ϕpni = ∀σ.∀σ
′.
(
lσ ∧ lσ′
)
⇒ P
[ (
P( lσ) = P( lσ′)
)]
= 1
where l denotes a low-observable atomic proposition. Observe that formula ϕpni
is a simplification of formula ϕpb in Section 3.1. In fact, most approaches to
prove probabilistic noninterference is by showing probabilistic bisimulation with
respect to low-observable propositions.
3.3 Quantitative Information Flow
Roughly speaking, the quantitative information flow (QIF) problem is concerned
with the amount of information that an attacker can learn about the high secu-
rity input by executing the program and observing the low security output, i.e.,
the difficulty of guessing the secret input from the channel output. QIF aims at
quantifying the amount of information in a high security input H (e.g., a pass-
word), which is the attacker’s initial uncertainty, from the amount of information
leaked to a low security output L (e.g., the result of a password verification),
and the amount of unleaked information about H (the attacker’s remaining un-
certainty). For example, consider the following two programs:
P1 , if H = c then L := 1 else L := 0
and
P2 , L := H
Although discrete noninterference would characterize both as insecure, QIF char-
acterizes P1 as “more” secure than P2.
QIF is founded on information-theoretic concepts (e.g., Shannon/min/guess-
entropy) that can compute the amount of leaked bits of a high security input [3,
6, 17, 19]. The bounding problem [26] is to determine whether that amount is
bounded from above by a constant q. Assuming that the values of the high
input security H to the program are uniformly distributed, each given in a
different initial state, and the program outputs a value from L only once at
termination, a simple QIF policy [8] is (1) starting from any high input, the
probability of reaching any of the low-observable output is bounded by log |L|log |H| ,
and (2) starting from every pair of high inputs, the probability of reaching the
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same low-observable output is the same. This QIF policy can be formulated in
HyperPCTL as follows:
ψqif = ∀σ.∀σ
′.
( ∧
l∈L
P( lσ) ≤
log |L|
log |H |
)
∧
( ∧
l∈L
P( lσ) = P( lσ′)
)
where l labels states where a different low security output from L is observed.
3.4 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy [9] is a commitment by a data holder to a data subject
(normally an individual) that he/she will not be affected by allowing his/her data
to be used in any study or analysis. Formally, let ǫ be a positive real number
and A be a randomized algorithm that makes a query to an input database
and produces an output. Algorithm A is called ǫ-differentially private, if for all
databasesD1 and D2 that differ on a single element, and all subsets S of possible
outputs of A, we have:
Pr [A(D1) ∈ S] ≤ e
ǫ · Pr [A(D2) ∈ S].
Differential privacy can be expressed in HyperPCTL by the following formula:
ψdp = ∀σ.∀σ
′.
[
dbSim(σ, σ′)
]
⇒[
P
(
(qOut ∈ S)σ
)
≤ eǫ · P
(
(qOut ∈ S)σ′
)]
where dbSim(σ, σ′) means that two different dataset inputs have all but one
similarity and qOut is the result of the query. For example, one way to provide
differential privacy is through randomized response in order to create noise and
provide plausible deniability. Let A be an embarrassing or illegal activity. In
a social study, each participant is faced with the query, “Have you engaged in
activity A in the past week?” and is instructed to respond by the following
protocol:
1. Flip and coin.
2. If tail, then answer truthfully.
3. If head, then flip the coin again and respond “Yes” if head and “No” if tail.
Thus, a “Yes” response may have been offered because the first and second coin
flips were both heads. This implies that, there are no good or bad responses and
an answer cannot be incriminating.
We now show that this social study is (ln 3)-deferentially private. For each
participant in the study, Fig. 2 shows the Markov chain of the response protocol,
where {t=y} (respectively, {t=n}) denotes that the truth is that the participant
did (respectively, did not) engage in activity A, and {r=y} (respectively, {r=n})
8
s0{t=y}
{r=y}
{r=n} {r=y}
0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5
1
1 1
s1{t=n}
{r=n}
{r=n} {r=y}
0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5
1
1 1
Fig. 2: Markov chain of the randomized response protocol.
means that the participant responds “Yes” (respectively, “No”). The HyperPCTL
formula is the following:
∀σ.∀σ′.
[(
(t=n)σ ∧ (t=y)σ′
)
⇒
(
P
(
(r=n)σ
)
≤ eln 3 · P
(
(r=n)σ′
))]
∧[(
(t=y)σ ∧ (t=n)σ′
)
⇒
(
P
(
(r=y)σ
)
≤ eln 3 · P
(
(r=y)σ′
))]
Observe that compared to formula ψdp, we have decomposed dbSim(σ, σ
′) to
two cases of t = y and t = n. Thus, in the left conjunct, the set S represents the
case where the response is “Yes” and in the right conjunct, the set S represents
the case where the response is “No”. It is straightforward to see that the DTMC
in Fig. 2 satisfies the formula, when for the left conjunct σ and σ′ are instantiated
by s0 and s1, respectively, and for the right conjunct σ and σ
′ are instantiated
by s1 and s0, respectively.
3.5 Probabilistic Causation
Probabilistic causation [11] aims to characterize the relationship between cause
and effect using the tools of probability theory. The reason for using probabili-
ties is that most causes are not invariably followed by their effects. For example,
smoking is a cause of lung cancer, even though some smokers do not develop
lung cancer and some people who have lung cancer are not smokers. Thus, we
need to somehow express that some causes are more likely to develop an effect.
Specifically, the central idea in probabilistic causation is to assert that the prob-
ability of occurring effect e if cause c happens is higher than the probability of
occurring e when c does not happen. We can express the most basic type of
probabilistic causation in HyperPCTL as follows:
ψpc1 = ∀σ.∀σ
′.
(
P(cσ U eσ) > P(¬cσ′ U eσ′)
)
.
Observe that we assume that the occurrence or absence of the cause is persistent
(hence, the until operator). Also, expressing causation in the standard PCTL
by stripping the state quantifiers in formula ψpc1 will damage the meaning of
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causation. The resulting PCTL formula captures the causation relation from each
initial state in isolation and it wrongly allows the probability of (c U e) from one
initial state to be less than the probability of (¬c U e) from another initial state.
One problem with formula ψpc1 is spurious correlations. For example, if c is
the drop in the level of mercury in a barometer, and e is the occurrence of a
storm, then the above formula may hold in a system, though c is not really the
cause of e. In fact, the real cause for both is the drop in atmospheric pressure.
To address this problem, we add a constraint, where there should be no further
event a that screens off e from c [22]:
ψpc2 = ∀σ.∀σ
′.¬∃σ′′.
(
P(cσ U eσ) > P(¬cσ′ U eσ′)
)
∧
∧
a∈AP\{e,c}
(
P((aσ′′ ∧ cσ′′) U eσ′′) = P(cσ U eσ)
)
.
The negation behind the existential quantifier can be pushed inside to obtain a
proper HyperPCTL formula. We note that for simplicity, in formula ψpc2 , propo-
sitions a and c occur in the same state in σ′′. A more general way is to allow
a happen before or simultaneously with c. Finally, we note that other concepts
in probabilistic causation such as Reichenbach’s Common Cause Principle and
Fork Asymmetry [22] (which emulates the second law of thermodynamics), as
well as Skyrms’s Background Contexts [24] can be expressed in a similar fashion.
4 HyperPCTL Model Checking
In the following, we show that the HyperPCTL model checking problem is decid-
able by introducing a model checking algorithm. The space complexity of our
algorithm is exponential in the number of quantifiers of the input formula, be-
cause for n state quantifiers, we build the n-ary self-composition of the input
DTMC. We are uncertain whether there exists a PSPACE algorithm, but we show
the PSPACE-hardness of the problem.
Let M = (S,P,AP, L) be a DTMC and ψ be a HyperPCTL quantified for-
mula with n state quantifiers. Informally, our model checking algorithm decides
whetherM |= ψ as follows (detailed pseudo-code is formulated in the Algorithms
1–3):
1. If n = 0, then ψ contains constants only; evaluate ψ and return the result.
2. Otherwise, if n > 0, then apply variable renaming such that the quantified
state variables are named σ1, . . . , σn.
3. Build the self-composition Mn.
4. Compute a labeling Lˆn(s) for all states s ∈ Sn of Mn as follows. Initially
Lˆn(s) = ∅ for all s ∈ Sn (Line 3 in Algorithm 1). For all sub-formulas ψ′ of
ψ inside-out do the following:
– If the subformula ψ′ has the form true, add true to the label sets Lˆn(s)
of all states s ∈ Sn (Line 3 in Algorithm 2).
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Algorithm 1: HyperPCTL model checking algorithm I
Input : DTMC M = (S,P,AP, L), HyperPCTL quantified formula ψ
Output : Whether M |= ψ
1 Function main(M, ψ)
2 n := number of quantifiers in ψ
3 let Lˆn : Sn → 2F with Lˆn(s) = ∅ for all s ∈ Sn
4 Lˆn(s) := HyperPCTL(M, ψ, n, Lˆn) % see Algorithm 2
5 if ψ ∈ Lˆn(s) for some s ∈ Sn then
6 return true
7 else
8 return false
– If the subformula ψ′ is an atomic proposition aσi , add aσi to the label
set of each state s ∈ Sn with ai ∈ Ln(s) (Line 5 in Algorithm 2).
– If the subformula ψ′ is ψ1 ∧ ψ2, then add ψ1 ∧ ψ2 to Lˆn(s) for each
s ∈ Sn with ψ1 ∈ Lˆn(s) and ψ2 ∈ Lˆn(s) (Lines 6 – 9 in Algorithm 2).
– If the subformula ψ′ is ¬ψ1, then add ¬ψ1 to Lˆn(s) for each s ∈ Sn with
ψ1 6∈ Lˆn(s) (Lines 10 – 12 in Algorithm 2).
– If the subformula ψ′ is p1 ∼ p2 (respectively p ∈ J), then compute for all
P(ϕ) appearing in p1 ∼ p2 (respectively, p ∈ J) for all states s ∈ Sn the
probability that ϕ holds in s using standard PCTL model checking, and
add for all s ∈ Sn the property p1 ∼ p2 (respectively, p ∈ J) to Lˆn(s)
if p1 ∼ p2 (respectively, p ∈ J) evaluates to true in s (Lines 13 – 16 in
Algorithm 2).
– If the subformula ψ′ is of the form ∃σi.ψ1, then label all states s =
(s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Sn with ∃σi.ψ1 iff there exists an s′i ∈ S, such that ψ1 ∈
Lˆn(s1, . . . , si−1, s
′
i, si+1, . . . , sn) (Lines 17 – 19 in Algorithm 2).
– If the subformula ψ′ is of the form ∀σi.ψ1, then label all states s =
(s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Sn with ∀σi.ψ1 iff for all s′i ∈ S it holds that ψ1 ∈
Lˆn(s1, . . . , si−1, s
′
i, si+1, . . . , sn) (Lines 20 – 22 in Algorithm 2).
5. Upon termination of the above iterative labeling procedure, as ψ is a sentence
and thus state-independent, either all states are labelled with it or none of
them. Return true if for an arbitrary state s we have ψ ∈ Lˆn(s) and return
false otherwise..
Theorem 1. For a finite Markov chain M and HyperPCTL formula ψ, the
HyperPCTLmodel checking problem, i.e.,M |= ψ can be solved in time O(poly(|M|)).
Theorem 2. The HyperPCTL model checking problem is PSPACE-hard in the
number of quantifiers in the formula.
Proof. We show that the HyperPCTL model checking problem is PSPACE-hard by
reducing the following PSPACE-hard quantified Boolean formula (QBF) satisfia-
bility problem [12] to it:
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Algorithm 2: HyperPCTL model checking algorithm II
Input : DTMC M = (S,P,AP, L), HyperPCTL quantified formula ψ,
non-negative integer n, Lˆn : Sn → 2F
Output : An extension of Lˆn to label each state s ∈ Sn with sub-formulas of ψ
that hold in s
1 Function HyperPCTL(M, ψ, n, Lˆn)
2 if ψ = true then
3 for all s ∈ Sn set Lˆn(s) := Lˆn(s) ∪ {true}
4 else if ψ = aσi then
5 for all s ∈ Sn with ai ∈ L
n(s) set Lˆn(s) := Lˆn(s) ∪ {aσi}
6 else if ψ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2 then
7 Lˆn:=HyperPCTL(M,ψ1,n,Lˆ
n)
8 Lˆn:=HyperPCTL(M,ψ2,n,Lˆ
n)
9 for all states s ∈ Sn with {ψ1, ψ2} ⊆ Lˆ
n(s) set Lˆn(s) := Lˆn(s) ∪ {ψ}
10 else if ψ = ¬ψ1 then
11 Lˆn:=HyperPCTL(M,ψ1,n,Lˆ
n)
12 for all states s ∈ Sn with ψ1 /∈ Lˆ
n(s) set Lˆn(s) := Lˆn(s) ∪ {ψ}
13 else if ψ = p1 ∼ p2 then
14 Ln1 := ProbMC(M, p1, n, Lˆ
n) % see Algorithm 3
15 Ln2 := ProbMC(M, p2, n, Lˆ
n) % see Algorithm 3
16 for all states s ∈ Sn with Ln1 (s) ∼ L
n
2 (s) set Lˆ
n(s) := Lˆn(s) ∪ {ψ}
17 else if ψ = ∃σi.ψ1 then
18 Lˆn:=HyperPCTL(M,ψ1,n,Lˆ
n)
19 for all states s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S
n with ψ1 ∈ Lˆ
n(s′) for some s′i ∈ S and
s′ = (s1, . . . , si−1, s
′
i, si+1, . . . , sn) set Lˆ
n(s) := Lˆn(s) ∪ {ψ}
20 else if ψ = ∀σi.ψ1 then
21 Lˆn:=HyperPCTL(M,ψ1,n,Lˆ
n)
22 for all states s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S
n with ψ1 ∈ Lˆ
n(s′) for all s′i ∈ S and
s′ = (s1, . . . , si−1, s
′
i, si+1, . . . , sn) set Lˆ
n(s) := Lˆn(s) ∪ {ψ}
23 return Lˆn
Given is a set {x1, x2, . . . , xn} of Boolean variables and a quantified
Boolean formula
y = Q1x1.Q1x2 . . .Qn−1xn−1.Qnxn.ψ
where Qi ∈ {∀, ∃} for each i ∈ [1, n] and ψ is an arbitrary Boolean
formula over variables {x1, . . . , xn}. Is y true?
We reduce the satisfiability problem for a quantified Boolean formula to
the model checking problem for a HyperPCTL formula with the same quantifier
structure as follows. We define the simple DTMC M = (S,P,AP, L) shown in
Fig. 3, which contains two states s0 and s1 and has two paths s
ω
0 and s
ω
1 . The
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Algorithm 3: HyperPCTL model checking algorithm III
Input : DTMC M = (S,P,AP, L), HyperPCTL probability expression p,
non-negative integer n, Lˆn : Sn → 2F
Output : Lnp : S
n → Q specifying the values Lnp (s) of p in all states s ∈ S
n
1 Function ProbMC(M, p, n, Lˆn)
2 let Lnp : S
n → Q with Lnp (s) = 0 for all s ∈ S
n
3 if p = c then
4 for all s ∈ Sn set Lnp (s) = c
5 else if p = p1 op p2 with op ∈ {+,−, ·} then
6 Ln1 := probMC(M, p1, n, Lˆ
n)
7 Ln2 := probMC(M, p2, n, Lˆ
n)
8 for each s ∈ Sn set Lnp (s) := L
n
1 (s) op L
n
2 (s)
9 else if p = P(ϕ) then
10 if ϕ = ψ then
11 for all s ∈ Sn set Lnp (s) =
∑
s′∈Sn, ψ∈Lˆn(s′) P(s, s
′)
12 else if ϕ = ψ1 U ψ2 then
13 compute the unique solution ν for the following equation system:
14 (1) ps = 0 for all states s ∈ S
n with ψ1 /∈ Lˆ
n(s) and ψ2 /∈ Lˆ
n(s), or
if no state s′ with ψ2 ∈ Lˆ
n(s′) is reachable from s
15 (2) ps = 1 for all states s ∈ S
n with ψ2 ∈ Lˆ
n(s)
16 (3) ps =
∑
s′∈Sn
P(s, s′) · ps′ for all other states
17 for all s ∈ Sn set Lnp (s) = ν(ps)
18 else if ϕ = ψ1 U
[k1,k2]ψ2 then
19 for each s ∈ Sn set Pn0 (s) = 1 if ψ2 ∈ Lˆ
n(s) and Pn0 (s) = 0 otherwise
20 for i = 1 to k2 do
21 for each s ∈ Sn set Pni (s) =
∑
s′∈Sn P(s, s
′) · Pni−1(s
′) if
ψ1 ∈ Lˆ
n(s) and Pni (s) = 0 otherwise
22 for all s ∈ Sn set Lnp (s) =
∑k2
i=k1
Pni (s)
23 return Lnp
HyperPCTL formula in our mapping is the following:
Q1σ1.Q1σ2 . . .Qn−1σn−1.Qnσn. ψ
′ (1)
s0 s1{x} ∅
1 1
Fig. 3: DTMC in
the proof of Thm 2.
where ψ′ is constructed from ψ by replacing every occur-
rence of a variable xi in ψ by xσi . The given quantified
Boolean formula is true if and only if the DTMC ob-
tained by our mapping satisfies HyperPCTL formula (1).
We translate every assignment to the trace quantifiers to
a corresponding assignment of the Boolean variables, and
vice versa, as follows: Assigning state s0 (s1) to σi means
that xi is set to true (false). 
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5 Related Work
Probabilistic noninterference [16,17] establishes connection between information
theory and information flow by employing probabilities to address covert chan-
nels. Intuitively, it requires that the probability of every pattern of low-observable
trace be the same for every low-equivalent initial state. Most efforts in reasoning
about probabilistic noninterference is through probabilistic weak bisimulation
(e.g. [25]). More recently, Sabelfeld and Sands [23] introduce a framework to en-
sure nonintereference for multi-threaded programs, where a probabilistic sched-
uler non-deterministically manages the execution of threads. They introduce
operational semantics for a simple imperative language with dynamic thread
creation, and how compositionality is ensured.
Epistemic logic [10] is a subfield of modal logic that is concerned with rea-
soning about knowledge. The semantic model of the logic is a Kripke structure,
where a set of agents are related with each other based on which states they
consider possible. A probabilistic version of the logic [14] assigns a probability
function to each agent at each state such that its domain is a non-empty subset
of the set of possible states. Epistemic temporal logic has been used to express
information-flow security policies (e.g., [2]). The relation between the expressive
power of probabilistic epistemic logic and HyperPCTL remains an open ques-
tion in this paper. Gray and Syverson [18] propose a modal logic for multi-level
reasoning about security of probabilistic systems. The logic is axiomatic and is
based on Halpern and Tuttle [14] framework for reasoning about knowledge and
probability. The logic is sound, but it may run into undecidability.
Clarkson and Schneider [7] introduce the notion of hyperproperties, a set-
theoretic framework for expressing security policies. A hyperproperty is a set
of sets of traces. In other words, a hyperproperty is a second-order property of
properties. The expressive power of hyperproperties do not exceed the second-
order logic, but it is currently unclear whether the full power of second-order
logic is needed to express hyperproperties of interest. Clarkson and Schneider
have shown two fundamental things: (1) a hyperproperty is an intersection of a
safety and a liveness hyperproperty, and (2) hyperproperties can express many
important requirements such as information-flow security policies (e.g., nonin-
tereference, observational determinism, etc), service-level agreement, etc.
Second-order logic is not verifiable in general, as it cannot be effectively and
completely axiomatized. Thus, temporal logics for subclasses of hyperproper-
ties have emerged [5]. HyperLTL and HyperCTL∗ allow explicit and simultane-
ous quantification over multiple paths to LTL and to CTL∗, respectively. As the
names suggest, HyperLTL allow quantification of linear traces and HyperCTL∗ per-
mits quantification over multiple execution traces simultaneously while allowing
branching-time paths for each trace. HyperLTL and HyperCTL∗ are not equipped
with probabilistic operators and cannot reason about probabilistic systems.
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6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we proposed the temporal logic HyperPCTL to express and reason
about probabilistic hyperproperties. HyperPCTL is a natural extension to PCTL by
allowing explicit and simultaneous quantification over model states. We defined
the syntax and semantics and presented a model checking algorithm for discrete-
time Markov chains. The complexity of the algorithm is PSPACE-hard in the
number of quantifiers in the input HyperPCTL formula. We presented multiple
examples from different domains, where HyperPCTL can elegantly express the
requirements.
We believe the results in this paper paves the path for new research direc-
tions. As for future work, an important unanswered question in this paper is to
determine tighter lower and upper bounds for the the complexity of HyperPCTL
model checking in the size of the formula. We believe most of the literature and
fundamental lines of research on PCTL verification should now be revisited in the
context of HyperPCTL. Examples include HyperPCTL model checking for Markov
decision processes (MDPs), Markov chains with costs, parameter synthesis and
model repair for probabilistic hyperproperties, HyperPCTL conditional probabili-
ties, developing abstraction/refinement, comparing expressive power to existing
related logics such as probabilistic epistemic logic [14], etc. An orthogonal di-
rection is deeper investigation of the examples presented in Section 3. Each of
those areas (e.g., differential privacy and probabilistic causation) deserve more
research to develop effective and efficient model checking techniques.
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